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FORGOTTEN IDEAS ABOUT MOTIONS
LEONARD

H.

BUCKLIN*

The average lawyer may spend more time arguing motions
before a judge than he spends in trial before a jury. That same
average lawyer will spend much time reading about "trial tactics".
Yet that lawyer spends little time increasing his knowledge about
motions.
The thoughts expressed in this paper are simply intended to
present some theories and ideas which often are forgotten by a
lawyer a few years after he is out of law school. This is not intended
to be a complete discussion of motions. The discussion is eclectic
and incomplete; many types of motions and many ideas about
motions are not even mentioned. The discussion is intended to be
thought-provoking and not comprehensive.
I.

WHO MAY MAKE A MOTION

Every lawyer knows that a party may make a motion in his
own case. We do not need to discuss that basic and unforgettable
idea. Instead, we should briefly consider the person who is not a
party to the action and who wishes to protect a real or imagined
interest in the case.
Any person interested in a lawsuit may make a motion with
reference to his interest in the suit. This is true whether or not
he is legally and technically a "party"."
The most common instance of a motion made by a person not
a party to the action is a motion for intervention. It is common
enough to be the subject of a special federal and state rule of
procedure; namely, Rule 24.2 A person may intervene when he
needs to protect his ihterests. The Rule 24 motion is an examplenot a limitation-of a basic right to make a motion even though
the person making the motion is not a party to the action.
Motions may be made by persons not parties in many other
situations. For example, a purchaser at a judicial sale may be
* B.S.L. University of Minnesota, 1955; J.D. University of Minnesota, 1957; Member
of th firm of Zuger, Bucklin, Kelsch and Zuger, Bismarck, North Dakota.
1. E.g., Leslie v. Gibson, 80 Kan. 504. 103 P. 115, 26 L.R.A. (NS) 1063, 1033 Am. St.
R. 219 (1909) (grantee may move to reopen case of grantor) ; State v. Werder, 200 Minn.
148, 273 N.W. 7141 (1937) (interested adjoinng property owner may move to prohibit payment of condemnation settlement) ; and 37 AM. JuL MOTIos § 7 (1938).
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 24; N.D. R. Civ. P. 24.
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allowed to proceed by motion in the principal case that led to the
judicial sale.3 This illustrates the basic principle: If you are interested, you can make a motion (whether the court will admit you
into the suit or grant your motion is a separate question).
Sometimes a person may make a motion even though it is not
technically made to protect his own interests. The motion to appear
as amicus curia is well known, and is such a motion.
It is the theory utilized by the amicus curia which really explains why persons who are not parties to the lawsuit may make
motions. The object of a lawsuit is to do justice. If someone who
is a party-or someone who is not a party-raises a point which
will afford better justice or avoid an injustice, there is4 no reason
why the court should not at least consider the motion.
II.

WHAT A MOTION IS

Perhaps the best we can do to define a motion is to say: A
motion is an application made to a court for the purpose of getting
something done.
A motion is usually a proceeding incidental to some other action,
but often it may be a wholly distinct or independent proceeding
that is called a motion. An example is the North Dakota proceeding
for amercement of a sheriff. Under the North Dakota statutes,
this amercement is to be done as a motion rather than as an
independent action. 5
However, as a general matter, motions are appropriate and
available only in the absence of remedies by regular pleadings and
only after a suit has been started with a pleading and process.
It has been said that a motion generally relates to procedure.6
But it is more accurate to say only that many motions ask for
procedural items, and not for substantive relief.
As a practical matter, motions often dispose of a trial of the
merits. Sometimes, by using a motion one may stop the lawsuit
altogether. For examples, consider the motions for dismissal for
lack of proper service of process or for keeping out of a trial a
critical piece of evidence. And often substantive relief is requested
to obviate a trial, as in a motion to dissolve an attachment made
by the true owner of property when he is not the defendant, or in
a motion for summary judgment.
No discussion of motions is complete without a reference to
dilatory motions. The need to discuss them arises because of the
3. Burner v. Hevener, 34 W. Va. 774, 12 S.E. 861, Am. St. R. 948 (1891).
4. This is not to say that there must be consideration of prolonged argument. See the
remarks about dilatory motions in text at pages 190-1.
5. N.D. CENT. CODE 28-21-19 (Supp. 1969).
6. 37 AM. Jura. Motionm § 3 (1938).
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way courts deal with them. Although courts often talk about dilatory
motions, they rarely do anything effective to prevent them from
arising in future cases.
The usual discussion of dilatory motions in a text book solemnly
intones that a dilatory motion is defined as a motion interposed for
the mere purpose of delay. The text then goes on to say that these
motions are not proper. Such discussion is not helpful; it merely
states the obvious. The real question is whether a dilatory motion
is useful to a client in some situation.
As a matter of analysis, the best thing to say about dilatory
motions is that any motion can be a dilatory motion, but no motion
should be a dilatory motion. Dilatory motions exist, and are useful
to some clients, simply because judges and attorneys are too timid
to throw dilatory motions out summarily.
A common use of a dilatory motion is the one made under the
guise of a motion for a more definite statement of the complaint.
Often such a motion is really used to delay answering so as to
delay the plaintiff from getting the matter on to an upcoming trial
calendar. In many of these instances, the judge could-and shouldexamine the situation, order a hearing in the next 12 or 24 hours,
deny the dilatory motion and assess against the clearly offending
and dilatory attorney full and adequate costs (including full attorney's fees) to reimburse the plaintiff for the cost of getting rid
of the dilatory motion. 7 Out of tender concern for incompetent
counsel, judges rarely do this. Instead judges ordinarily give five
days notice to counsel before hearing the motion and although they
deny the dilatory motion,8 they also customarily deny the wronged
party any reimbursement of attorney's fees. This disposal of the
motion rewards the maker of the dilatory motion (who has gained
time and paid no money penalty).
Until judges become champions of right to the extent of penalizing the incompetent attorney or the attorney who intentionally uses
a dilatory motion for his client, the dilatory motion will be available to those attorneys who wish to use it.
Some attorneys may protest that although the dilatory motion
is an evil, it is a necessary evil in order to gain a reasonable time
to defend against a well prepared adversary who has surprised
you. For example, it may be said that a dilatory motion may be
7. Assessment against an attorney may be done by the court with its power to control its own attorneys in their practice before the court. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 27-05-06
(3) and 27-10-03 (1) (1960). It may also be done under the Rule 11 sanctions which are
made applicable to motions by N.D.R. Civ. P. 7(b).
8. Judges do deny a dilatory motion (a motion interposed for mere purposes of delay). The exqeptions to this categorical statement are not numerically important. My
point is that by the time the motion is denied, its purpose has been accomplished, and the
dilatory party has suffered no loss by the use of the motion to gain delay.
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needed to prevent a case from being put at issue and on a trial
calendar before defense counsel can be reasonably well prepared.
The remedy for such a situation is not a dilatory motion which
holds up progress-regardless of the merits of the argument for
more time. The remedy is a motion for continuance of the case
over the court term on the honest ground that defense counsel is
entitled to adequate time to prepare and has not yet had such a
reasonable time. The trial court has a wide discretion to grant or
deny motions for continuance, 9 but its duty is to grant a continuance if substantial justice will be more nearly attained. 10
III.

WHERE A MOTION CAN BE HEARD

A motion may be made any place in the state. Nevertheless,
it can only be heard within the district of the venue of the case.
As a general statement, it is true that district judges, being
judges of a court of general jurisdiction in the state, can generally
act any place in the state. Nevertheless, the North Dakota Constitution has set up certain restrictions on the powers of judges. The
Constitution specifies that district judges can act in districts other
than their own only under the authority of statute." The North
Dakota Legislature has enacted the statutory rules under which
district judges can act outside their district. 2 These statutes provide
that if a contested motion is being heard by a judge of the district
in which the action is pending, then the motion can be heard only
in such district. 3 (However, if the motion is properly being heard
by a judge of a different district, it can be heard either in the
4
trial district or in an adjoining judicial district.)'
A lawyer could not safely advise his client that a motion could
be heard outside of the district even if the parties agreed to waive
the statutory limitation. This is because it can be argued later by
an adversary that the matter is one of jurisdiction of the district
court, and that the jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot
be conferred by the consent of the parties. Furthermore, a North
Dakota statute specifically states that an order given contrary to
the limitations regarding the place of hearing of a motion shall
be voidable. 5 The distinction between a voidable judgment and a
void one is important since actions taken under a voidable order
are proper until the order is made void by appropriate action.
Since the statute provides for the appropriate action by which to
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

In re Smith's Estate, 69 N.D. 437, 288 N.W. 235 (1939).
Brady v. Malone, 4 Iowa (4 Cole) 146 (1857).
N.D. CONST. § 116.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05-22 (1960).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05-22(5) (1960).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05-22(5) (1960).
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05-23 (1960).
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assert the voidability, 16 a failure to assert the voidability and to
make void the order in the timely and direct way prescribed will
17
make the order valid.
It will also be noted that a judge's power allows him to hear
a contested motion any place in the judicial district. The judge's
power is not limited to the county where the action is brought or
tried.
Furthermore, if the motion is heard ex parte it can be heard
any place in the state that a judge can be found. 8
Neither the presence of the clerk of court nor any other official
is necessary for the judge to hear a motion. 9 Since the power of
the district court resides in the judge and not in the courthouse
it is not necessary to go to the courthouse to have a hearing if
the parties are otherwise before the judge.
IV.

WHEN A MOTION CAN BE HEARD

A motion can be made at any time; that is, before trial,
during trial, or after trial. However, the scope of this writing is
intentionally limited to comments pertinent to motions before trial.
Statute or court rule generally prescribes when motions may
be made. In North Dakota, Rule 6(d) provides that a written motion
(except for those that are heard ex parte) and notice of the hearing
must be served not later than five days before the time specified
20
for hearing.
The procedural concept that is labeled "an order to show cause"
in a civil case is usually nothing more than a motion under a
different name. By using the different name for a motion, certain
time limitations are dispensed with. In other words, by calling it
an order to show cause, one need not make a separate application,
directed to the court, requesting a shortening of the time for
notice of the hearing of a motion.
For the psychological and "public-relations" reasons noted below, courts should normally refuse to issue an "order to show
cause" when a "motion" would work just as well. Unfortunately,
courts do not normally refuse to sign the papers presented to them
when they are cast in the form of an order to show cause instead
of an application for a motion on shortened time.
There is a very good reason for the moving party to cast a
motion in the form of an "order to show cause". This is because
16. Id.
17. Smith v. King, 58 N.D. 680, 227 N.W. 228 (1929) ; Missouri,Slope Land & Inv. Co.
v. Halstead, 27 N.D. 591, 147 N.W. 643 (1914).
18. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05-24 (1960).
19. N.D.R. Cry. P. 77 (b).
20. N.D.R. Civ. P. 6(d).
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the form is confusing enough to laymen, and to educated laymen
such as judges and attorneys, that the burden of proof often is
thrown on the defending party's shoulders.
An order to show cause specifically "orders" a person to come
forth and show cause why something should not be done. Psychologically, therefore, everyone looks to the defendant party to prove
"that he isn't guilty." This, of course, is not the correct legal
principle. Legally, it is still up to the moving party to show that
he is entitled to relief. But psychologically, the burden is shifted.
Not only is there a shift of the "psychological" burden of proof
in an order to show cause, but also the person served with such
an order feels that the court is already taking sides (against him).
Legally, this is not true, but a layman who is ordered to show
cause why he should not be restrained from beating his wife, cannot
help but feel that the judge already believes the husband intends
to beat his wife. Unless there is a reason why a paper entitled
"motion" will not suffice, therefore, the courts should avoid "orders
to show cause" because of the unfortunate public-relations result
and because of the confusion in "psychological" burden of proof.
It may be noted that our Rule 6(d) states that an order to
shorten the time for service of a motion before the hearing may
be made by ex parte application to the court. 21 There is nothing
that requires the application to be made in writing. Therefore, there
is no reason why the court's own order is not enough of a record.
Presumably (although, of course, it is unfortunately not always
true) the court has determined that there is a need for a shortened
period before issuing the order shortening the time.
A point that is not followed in practice is that when a motion
is made and served by mail, notice of hearing should be served
not later than eight days before the time specified for the hearing.
This is because Rule 6(d) states that the responding party shall
have at least five days notice, 22 and Rule 6(e) provides that if
the notice is served by mail, three days shall be added to the
23
time that a party has as a matter of right before the hearing.
V. HOW A MOTION IS HEARD
Historically, motions generally have been heard on the basis
of the affidavits presented to the court together with the pleadings.
[T] here has never been any doubt but that affidavits are
proper, and indeed in such cases the court can weigh the
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Id.
N.D.R. Civ. P. 6(e).
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affidavits and resolve the fact issues on the basis of them,
24
in accord with the historic practice of the courts ....
Our North Dakota statutes specifically provide that testimony
of witnesses may be taken by affidavits 25 and affidavits may be
26
used upon a motion.
In addition to affidavits, live witnesses may be used at a motion
hearing. In North Dakota, our Rules provide:
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record
the court may hear the matter on affidavits presented by
the respective parties, but the court may direct that the
matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
depositions. 27 [emphasis added].
In many states, the practice of using live witnesses at a motion
hearing is quite common. It is rather unusual in North Dakota practice, but there is no reason why it should not be resorted to. I
have never had a judge refuse my request to have a witness who
is present in the courtroom testify on a motion.
The use of live witnesses is a psychological advantage which
is frequently overlooked by attorneys. A lawyer who would never
try a case to a jury by reading depositions to the jury should
realize the advantage of a live witness testifying on a motion.
Of course, the disadvantages of using a live witness are that
the witness may become confused and he may be cross-examined.
On the other hand, an affidavit can be drawn up at leisure (using
the attorney's well-chosen words), and the affiant is not cross28
examined.
It should be noted that affidavits to be used by the moving
party with a motion are required to be served with the motion.2 9
However, this should be interpreted to mean that they may be
served at any time up to the time limit set forth by the Rules for
the service of the notice of motion. In other words, there seems
to be no prejudice in having the notice of motion served in advance and then the affidavits served in the minimum required
time of five 0 or eight days 3' before the hearing. Regarding the
opposition's affidavits, opposing affidavits may be served up until
32
one day before the hearing.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

W. BAIWON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRAcTiCE AND PROCEDuRE § 346, at 293 (1960).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-01 (1960).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-04-05(6) (1960).
N.D.R. Civ. P. 43(e).
Meyer v. Wright, 234 Iowa 1158, 15 N.W.2d 268 (1944).
N.D.R. Civ. P. 6(d).
Id.
Three days are added if service is by mail, N.D.R. Civ. P. 6(e).
N.D.R. Civ. P. 6(d).
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Unfortunately, many attorneys come to the hearing armed with
their affidavits and present them to the opposing counsel at that
time only, even though the attorney has had ample time to serve
the affidavits before the hearing. Traditionally, the judges allow
this loose and unfair practice, and judges may do so under their
general powers. 3 However, it would seem that if a party wishes
to object to late service of an affidavit which could reasonably have
been served earlier, the court should ordinarily, and without further
showing of necessity: (1) grant a continuance of the hearing in
order to allow the objecting party time to consider the affidavit
and to prepare any opposing affidavits or new arguments; and
(2)-this is most important-allow reasonable attorney's fees against
the offending attorney for the time involved in a second appearance.
A motion should ordinarily be made in writing. This is provided
for by Rule 7(b) .4 There are certain advantages of judicial administration in making the motion in writing. First of all, it is the
most practical way of giving proper notice of the motion. Secondly,
the written motion makes a precise record of what the court acted
upon.
It is frequently overlooked that in 1963 the North Dakota Supreme Court issued further rules of court for the district courts.
These are not contained in the well organized and numbered Rules
of Civil Procedure, but are contained in a separate code of rules.
It may be argued that certain provisions in Rule V of the rules of
court adopted in 1963 affect motion practice. For example, it is
stated in Rule V that all motions with supporting instruments "shall"
be filed three days before the date of the hearing and all returns
"shall" be filed at least one day before the date of hearing.3 5 The
penalty for failing to comply with these provisions is that the court
may vacate the motion or supporting document.3 6
VI.

SUCCESS IN THE MOTIONS-COSTS

An order granting or denying a motion should briefly state
upon its face the documents or evidence upon which the order was
made. The common way to do this is to simply state that it was
made upon the entire record and all proceedings. This is often an
33. This situation is rather common. The judge allows the practice not because of the
failure of objection but bedause most judges take the position that if prejudice is not
shown, there can be no violation of theRules. In theory this sounds fine but in practlie it
puts the burden upon the objecting party to show damage to himself and ordinarily this
cannot be shown. The judge customarily asks the question such as: "Are you surprised by
this new material?" The attorney usually has to state that he is not surprised by the general nature of the affidavit, although he is with the particulars contained therein.
34. N.D.R. Civ. P. 7(b).
35. N.D.R. DIST. CT. V.
36. N.D.R. DIST. CT. V(a).
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inaccurate description of what the judge looked at or listened to.
An order which is otherwise appealable may not be appealable
if the order does not describe the papers or evidence upon which
the order was made.3 7 The appellate court has discretion to dismiss
an appeal on such an order.
Rule 37 (also enacted by the Legislature as a general enactment of the court rules) of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides
for motion costs in full amounts, including attorney's fees, which
may be assessed against a losing party in certain instances.38
Moreover, the North Dakota Century Code provides that upon
any motion the court has discretion to allow motion costs of up to
$25.00.19 Both statute and case law to be discussed later therefore
indicate that in any case the court can award motion costs to the
prevailing party.
A good argument can be made that the dollar limit specified
by the Legislature does not bind the courts.
First of all, it may be argued that Section 27-02-09 of the North
Dakota Century Code 40 provides that all statutes relating to practice and procedure shall have force and effect only until otherwise
altered by rules promulgated by the North Dakota Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, of course, in fact has promulgated Rule 83
of the Rules of Civil Procedure which broadly authorizes the district courts to regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent
with the Rules of Civil Procedure. 41 The regulation of motion practice would seem to include the awarding of motion costs. Therefore, it can be argued that any statutory limit on costs to be awarded
as a matter of controlling motion practice is superseded by the
legislative authorization to courts to negate "practice" statutes,
and the court's action in regulating its own practice in the matter
before the court.
Furthermore, it can be said that the judicial power which the
courts receive through the Constitution includes the power to do
all acts necessary to do justice and administer their own proceedings. In many cases this power could logically include the power
to assess costs of a motion in an actual and full amount. The
legislature cannot remove any constitutional judicial power.
The statutory statement that the district courts have:
All the powers, according to the usages of courts of law
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

N.D. CENT.
N.D.R. Civ.
N.D. CENT.
N.D. CENT.
N.D.R. CIV.

CODE § 28-27-02.1 (1960).
P. 37(a).
CODE § 28-26-18 (1960).
CODE § 27-02-09 (1960).
P. 83.
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and equity, necessary to . . . the full and complete administration of justice . . . 42
is a statement of existing constitutional law and not a grant or
limitation.
Clearly, if motion costs are not within the power of the court
to award, the court is without power to completely administer
justice or to adequately control its procedure (for example, to prevent dilatory motions).
The equity power of the courts has historically included the
power to award actual attorney fees to a prevailing party where
43
it is thought necessary for equitable reasons.
Allowance of such costs in appropriate situations is part
of the historic equity jurisdiction of the federal courts. The
suits 'in equity' of which these courts were given 'cognizance'
ever since the first Judiciary Act, constituted that body
of remedies, procedures and practices which theretofore had
been evolved in the English Court of Chancery. . . . The
sources bearing on eighteenth-century English practice . . .
uniformly support the power not only to give a fixed allowance for the various steps in a suit, what are known as
costs 'between party and party,' but also as much of the
entire expenses of the litigation of one of the parties as
fair justice to the other party will permit, technically known
as costs 'as between solicitor and client. . . .' Plainly the
foundation for the historic practice of granting reimbursement for the costs of litigation other than the conventional
taxable costs is part of the original authority 4 of the chancellor to do equity in a particular situation.
It is not necessary for the trial court to receive evidence as
to what is a reasonable attorney's fee in order to award an attorney's fee on a motion. Our court has said:
The court is an expert on what is a reasonable fee. . . . The
trial judge before whom the action was tried had knowledge
of the character of the litigation, the preparation and skill
of the. presentation, and the results obtained, and could make
appraisal of the reasonable value of services rendered with
or without the aid of additional testimony. It may consider
its own knowledge and experience in making an45 appraisal
of the reasonable value of the services rendered.
In spite of the constitutional law argument that the courts have
inherent power to award costs, courts have sometimes indicated
42.
43.
44.
45.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-05-06(3) (1960).
Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
Id. at 164-66.
Morton County Bd. of Park Comm'rs v. Wetsch, 14,2 N.W.2d 751 (N.D. 1966).
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they do not possess this power. 46 Even our North Dakota Supreme
Court has sometimes indicated this. Thus, in Sjol v. Sjol, 4 7 our
court said that the limitation of $25.00 provided in Section 28-26-18
of the North Dakota Century Code "applies to motions generally. ' 4 8
However, in the Sjol case, the court then went on to allow
higher motion fees by pointing out that in divorce actions either
party may be required to pay the money to prosecute or defend
the action. The court then stated that under the divorce statutes 49
there is authority for the court to require payment of larger motion
costs than $25.00.
The same situation-the court finding a broad exception which
allows assessment of substantial costs-occurred in Swallow v. First
State Bank.5 0 There the court first said that it is well settled that
costs are creatures of, and can be awarded only when authorized
by statute. Nevertheless, the court went on to state, when a motion
is granted "within the sound discretion of the trial court ' 5' the
court may require payment of larger sums as a condition precedent
to the court acting in favor of the party against whom the costs
are imposed. Thus the court said (dicta) that when a new trial
is awarded on the basis of the discretion of the trial court (and
not on the basis of the party being entitled to a new trial as a
matter of right) then the court may require the moving party to
pay the entire cost of the former trial as a condition precedent
to a new trial.
A hint as to what might now occur in our present court is
found in Aune v. City of Mandan.52 The court without discussion
merely awarded $75.00 as motion costs for a motion in the Supreme
Court. It would seem that if the Supreme Court is entitled to award
motion costs in excess of an alleged statutory limit that the trial
court should have the same power. Both the Supreme Court and
the trial court have the constitutional power and the duty to see
that justice is done through the courts' procedure concerning motions.
In the Aune case the Supreme Court phrased the award of
motion costs in terms of a condition to its denial of a motion.
Hence, it could be said that the decision comes within the theory
enunciated in Swallow v. First State Bank.5 s This theory is, of
course, that costs may be awarded as a condition of the court
46. E.g., Redfield v. Davis, 42 S.D. 556, 176 N.W. 512 (1920).
47. 76 N.D. 336, 35 N.W.2d 797 (1949); see also Torgrinson v. Norwich School Dist.,
14 N.D. 10, 103 N.W. 414 (19014).
48. SJol v. SJol, 76 N.D. 336, 35 N.W.2d 797, 799 (1949).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-23 (1960).
50. 35 N.D. 323, 160 N.W. 137 (1916).
51. Id. at 328, 160 N.W. at 139.
52. 166 N.W.2d 559 (N.D. 1969).
53. 35 N.D. 323, 160 N.W. 137 (1916).
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exercising its discretion in favor of the person against whom the
costs are awarded. Such a theory, however, is bottomed on the
idea that the court has an inherent power to do justice.
Since the court has held that full costs in motion practice may
be awarded against an offending party who is granted relief by the
court, it would also seem just-and equally as rational-that costs
may also be awarded even though the offending party does not
obtain relief by paying for it. A wrongdoer who clearly is not
entitled to relief (i.e., to discretion in his favor) should not be
treated better than one whose lapse is not so serious. Either our
courts have the power to adequately and equitably control motion
practice or they do not. Adequate and equitable control rests on
the power to financially penalize the party who misuses motion
procedure and to prevent financial loss to the party who has been
wronged. I would hope that in an appropriate case the North Dakota
Supreme Court would take the opportunity to adequately research
the constitutional, equitable, and administrative principles involved
and clearly state that trial courts do have the power to award full
motion costs when necessary to penalize an offending party and
to control motion practice.
The arguments regarding the granting of costs on a motion
may be summarized as follows:
1.

It is clear that a court has discretion to allow motion costs
in any case. Whether there is any limit short of actual
costs the amount that a court may award is a matter
of dispute.

2.

In some instances a specific rule of civil procedure will
apply to the situation and will provide for motion costs
without limitation as to amount, e.g., Rule 37.

3.

In some instances a specific statute will be authority
for granting costs without limitation as to amount, e.g.,
divorce statutes authorizing payment of attorney fees
by either party.

4.

Motion costs may be assessed without limitation as to
amount against a party who is being given something
by the exercise of the court's discretion.

5.

There is considerable authority for the proposition that
the awarding of costs in most situations is limited to
an award not exceeding the $25 authorized by the legislature through Section 28-26-18 of the North Dakota Century Code.

6.

It can be argued that the awarding of motion costs is
a matter of practice which the courts by statutory authorization may regulate themselves; Section 27-02-09 of
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the North Dakota Century Code and Rule 83 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure combine to overcome the $25
limitation of Section 28-26-18 of the North Dakota Century Code.
7.

The practice of equity courts has allowed awarding of
full motion costs and statutes grant the court all the
powers, according to the customary equity practice, to
do full justice.

8.

The policing of motion practice through motion costs is
necessary for the administration of justice; therefore,
the courts have the constitutional power to assess and
award full motion costs and that constitutional judicial
power cannot be restricted by the legislature.

My personal experience in the trial courts of this state is that
the trial courts recognize that they have the power to assess adequate costs in motion proceedings, even though the costs exceed
$25.00. This has been done either on the theory that the trial court
has statutory and Supreme Court authorization, to regulate effectively its own practice in motions or on the theory that it is a part
of the constitutional power of the court to do justice.
Very simply, as mentioned before, if full motion costs are not
within the power of the court to award, the court is without power
to completely administer justice or to adequately control its procedure. The court is not without power; and the court does have
authority to award motion costs to do equity and control procedure.
It is not only the court's power and authority; it is the court's duty.

